

The relationship between knowledge and *jouissance* is a primitive one, and it is where what emerges with the appearance of the apparatus of the signifier comes to be inserted. It is henceforth conceivable that we are binding up the function of this emergence of the signifier.

"That will do!" I hear you say. "Do we really need to explain everything? And, why not, the origins of language?" We all know that to structure knowledge correctly one needs to abandon the question of origins. What we are doing, in spelling this out, is superfluous with respect to what we have to develop this year, which is situated at the level of structures. It is a futile search for meaning. But, as I have already said, let's take note of what we are.

I will go on, then. At the intersection of a *jouissance*—and not just any *jouissance*, it must no doubt remain opaque—at the intersection of a *jouissance* that is privileged above all others—not because it is sexual *jouissance*, since what this *jouissance* designates by being at this intersection is the loss of sexual *jouissance*, castration—in relation to this meeting point with sexual *jouissance* there emerges, in the Freudian fable of repetition, the engendering of something radical that gives body to a schema that is, literally, articulated. S_1 , having emerged at the first moment, is repeated with respect to S_2 . The subject emerges from this entry into a relation, the subject that something, a certain loss, represents. And it is worth having made this effort in the direction of meaning in order to comprehend the ambiguity.

It was not for nothing that last year I called "surplus *jouissance*" this same object that I had moreover described as the one that the entire dialectic of frustration in analysis is organized around. This means that the loss of the object is also the gap, a hole opened up to something, and we don't know whether or not this something is the representation of the lack in *jouissance*, which is situated by means of the knowledge process, insofar as it appears in a completely different light as a result of being, from that point on, knowledge scanded by the signifier. Is it even the same?

The relationship to *jouissance* is suddenly made to appear in a different light by this still virtual function called the function of desire. Moreover this is why I'm describing what appears here as "surplus *jouissance*" and not forcing anything or committing any transgression.

I beg you to bite your tongue a bit over all this nonsense. What analysis shows, if it shows anything at all—I invoke here those whose soul is a little bit different from the one of which one could say, as Barrès says of the cadaver, that it talks nonsense—is very precisely the fact that we don't ever transgress.⁵ Sneaking around is not transgressing. Seeing a door half-open is not the same as going through it. We shall have the occasion to come back

⁵ Maurice Barrès (1862–1923), French writer and conservative political figure of French nationalism.

so what I am introducing now—there is no transgression here, but rather an *irruption*, a falling into the field, of something not unlike *jouissance*—a surplus.

But perhaps even that has to be paid for. That is why I told you last year that in Marx the *a*, which is here, is recognized as functioning at the level that is articulated—on the basis of analytic discourse, not any of the others—in surplus *jouissance*. Here you have what Marx discovered as what actually happens at the level of surplus value.

Of course, it wasn't Marx who invented surplus value. It's just that prior to him nobody knew what its place was. It has the same ambiguous place as the one I have just mentioned, that of excess work, of surplus work. "What does it pay in?" he says. "It pays in *jouissance*, precisely, and this has to go somewhere."

What's disturbing is that if one pays in *jouissance*, then one has got it, and then, once one has got it it is very urgent that one squander it. If one does not squander it, there will be all sorts of consequences.

Let's leave the thing up in the air for the moment.

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What am I up to? I am beginning to get you to acknowledge, simply through locating it, that this four-footed apparatus, with its four positions can be used to define four radical discourses.

It's no accident that I presented this form to you as the first. There is no reason why I could not have begun with any of the others, with the second for instance. But it is a fact, determined by historical reasons, that this initial form—the one that we express by starting with this signifier that represents a subject with respect to another signifier—has a very special importance, insofar as, in what I am going to state this year, it will be singled out as being, of the four, the one that articulates the master's discourse.

The master's discourse. I don't see any point in recounting its historical importance, given that you are, after all, on the whole recruited through unaware that it's all philosophy, and that, as a consequence, you are not ing about this alone, that is before it began to talk about. Even before it began to stand out, and is quite specially illustrated by its name—at least in Hegel's discourse, that is before it called it by its name—it was already apparatus of interest to us concerning discourse something appeared which is which is called philosophy, irrespective of its ambiguity, and